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SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC. V. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.:
A CASE FOR INCREASED REGULATION OF THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY
ERICA WESSLING*
ABSTRACT
The relatively short history of the airline industry is characterized by
sudden shifts and divergent standards that attempt to negotiate a complex
market. High demand, uniqueness of service, and difficulty of market entry
render the market particularly susceptible to monopolization among competitors. Recently, the rise of the low-cost carrier business model has
exposed high barriers to entry into the airline market. In attempts to remedy
the harm against both prospective market entrants and consumers, lowcost carriers have levied price predation claims against entrenched legacy
airlines. Due to the difficulty in negotiating the divide between predatory
behavior and lawful competition, courts have been justifiably reticent to
penalize carriers for competitive pricing of passenger fare. However, despite
the likely legality of the pricing structure of incumbent airlines, other exclusionary practices, such as gate monopolization, fortify high barriers to
entry and highlight the need for a shift in judicial and regulatory standards.
Through analysis of the decision in Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., this Note analyzes antitrust issues within the helpful framework
of contestability theory and considers judicial and regulatory changes to
benefit new entrant airlines and consumers.

*
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INTRODUCTION
Due to the unique nature of the airline industry, reassessment of judicial
standards and increased regulation is crucial in order to promote healthy competition among air carriers and to protect consumers. Recently, the rise of the
low-cost carrier business model in the 1990s has added an additional layer
to this dynamic industry.1 Difficulties faced by low-cost carriers entering the
market affirm the applicability of contestability as a theoretical guide, even if
it is unattainable in reality.2 Barriers to entry include monopolistic gate
leasing agreements and the hub dominance of high-cost legacy carriers. 3
These obstacles highlight the need for a shift in antitrust and regulatory policy
in order to facilitate competition.
The success of low-cost carriers has provoked a retaliatory response by
incumbent legacy carriers, which “appear[] to be on a homicidal mission to
destroy the low-fare airlines.”4 As a result, a slew of price predation claims
have been made by low-cost carriers against entrenched legacy carriers.5
These cases contest and attempt to delineate the fine line that divides illegal
predatory practices from fair competition. In particular, the decision of the
court in Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.6 demonstrates the need
for a shift in the analysis of price predation claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act.7
This Note proposes that high barriers of entry to the airline market,
while providing the opportunity for price predation, should not be considered
by courts as dispositive of price predation. Instead, high barriers to entry
1

Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predation, Competition & Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the Airline Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 704 (2002) [hereinafter Dempsey, Turbulence in the
Airline Industry]; see also Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets:
Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 478 (1987) [hereinafter
Levine, Airline Competition].
2
Dempsey, Turbulence in the Airline Industry, supra note 1, at 704; see also Levine,
Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 397.
3
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692; Severin Borenstein, On the Persistent Financial Losses
of U.S. Airlines: A Preliminary Exploration; Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
no. 16744 at 10–11 (Jan. 2011), available at http://perma.cc/UP6Y-9P59.
4
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 688. The success of the low-cost carrier business model
has prompted legacy carriers to defend their market dominance out of fear that increased
competition will undermine their ability to maintain the high passenger fares that
subsidize the “bells and whistles” of their expensive business model. Spirit Airlines, Inc.
v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 922 (6th Cir. 2005). Whereas the profitability of low-cost
carriers depends solely upon low fares, hub-and-spoke model legacy carriers seek to secure
consumer loyalty by means of special programs, such as frequent flyer miles. Id.
5
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 690.
6
Spirit, 431 F.3d at 917.
7
15 U.S.C. §2 (2004).
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indicate the need for stricter regulations promulgated with the purpose of
facilitating or providing equal grounds for market entry. Such changes would
promote fair and healthy competition in the airline industry, thereby generating consumer benefit.
Part I of this Note will discuss the historical background and commercial
framework of the airline industry, the theory of perfect market contestability, and the rise of the low-cost carrier business model. Part II will then
discuss the Spirit decision. The conclusion will critique the Spirit court’s
price predation analysis, focusing on the court’s inappropriate focus on
predatory intent, mischaracterization of the relevant market for price predation purposes, and failure to utilize the theoretical guidelines provided
by market contestability. Further, this Note contends that, although high
barriers to entry may enhance opportunities for price predation, they are
not dispositive of anti-competitive behavior in violation of antitrust laws.
Instead, such barriers to entry confirm that the airline industry is not perfectly contestable and demonstrate the need for increased regulation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Effects of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was established to oversee
the “economic regulation of the burgeoning airline industry” and to monitor “substantial competitive impulses” among airlines.8 The CAB was granted
authority to regulate interstate air travel and retained sole authority over matters such as issuing operating permits and approving and assigning routes.9
The purpose for establishing the CAB was to hinder “destructive and cannibalistic” competitive practices among airlines in an industry that naturally
tends to form monopolies.10 The CAB sought to ensure fair practice regarding market entry and to restrict anti-competitive tactics.11 Under a generous grant of authority, the CAB regulated most air carrier business activity,
including “entry and exit from individual city-pair markets, air fares, methods
of competition, mergers and acquisitions, and inter-carrier agreements.”12
In 1978, Jimmy Carter approved the Deregulation Act (“Act”) with the
purpose of limiting the scope of federal aviation regulations in order to
8
Timothy M. Ravich, Re-Regulation and Airline Passengers’ Rights, 67 J. AIR L. & COM.
935, 959, 960 (2002). When the CAB was created, airlines primarily transported mail, not
passengers. Id.
9
Id. at 960.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Stephen E. Creager, Airline Deregulation and Airport Regulation, 93 YALE L.J.
319, 319–20 (1983).
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encourage a “market-driven commercial aviation system.”13 The Act served
to lessen the control of the CAB and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) over the commercial aviation industry.14 Although the FAA retained
some control to regulate airway safety matters, most authority to influence
the “day-to-day” operation of airports was greatly restricted by the Act.15
Prior to the Act, the CAB was the final regulatory authority charged to
approve all airline route decisions.16 Proponents of deregulation contend
that the CAB’s exercise of its broad powers unnecessarily impeded market
entry and prevented the airline market from approaching an optimal competitive state.17 For instance, the CAB granted none of the seventy-nine applications it received from new entrants seeking access to a route between 1950
and 1974.18 Meanwhile, incumbent domestic airlines secured their “advantageous positions” by means of the benevolent oversight of the CAB prior
to 1978.19 Despite the salutary effects of deregulation, entrenched incumbent airlines have retained a large degree of control and can prevent new
airlines from entering the market.20 One concern is that incumbents may
utilize this power to thwart new entrants while remaining “immune” from
antitrust allegations.21
One of the effects of deregulation was to transfer much of the “administrative regulatory burden” of air transportation from airlines to airports.22
Further, current regulation of airport user fees prevents airports from dealing
with this “burden.”23 Ensuring fair and efficient access to airport gates, routes,
and terminals has been one of the greatest post-deregulation problems.24
With the diminishment of CAB authority following deregulation, slots are
allocated among commercial carriers by means of a scheduling committee,
13

Ravich, supra note 8, at 961.
Creager, supra note 12, at 320.
15
Ravich, supra note 8, at 961; Creager, supra note 12, at 320.
16
Creager, supra note 12, at 332.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 328 n.56.
19
Id. at 339.
20
Id. at 333.
21
Id. at 339. Despite its goal of facilitating optimal competition, the Act did not address
the potential harm of dominant incumbent airlines. Critics of deregulation argue that, far
from balancing out a market dominated by incumbents, deregulation “shifted the effective
power of approval of new air routes from the CAB ... to incumbent airlines.” Id. at 332.
22
Id. at 319.
23
Id.
24
Id. Proposed solutions to the issue of fair opportunity for new entrants by means of
regulatory policy include “allocating access to airports by auction, subjecting the airport
terminal subleasing policies of airlines to a heightened antitrust scrutiny, foreclosing the
ability of certain airlines to veto plans to expand airport terminal capacity, and requiring new
entrant airlines to bear the full cost of their entry.” Id.
14
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which permits the airlines the opportunity to bargain.25 Should this process
fail, the FAA has retained some authority to intervene.26
The 1978 Airline Deregulation Act (“Act”) was promulgated under the
theory that regulation interfered with the “naturally competitive” airline industry.27 Analysts contended that the airline market would achieve “perfect
competition” in the absence of regulation.28 The Act entrusted airline competitors with greater business discretion under the belief that competition
would lead to “optimal price and output conditions” due to the “perfectly
contestable” nature of the airline industry.29 The Act was further intended to
facilitate market entry for new competitors, which was necessary to achieve
any semblance of perfect competition.30
Deregulation in 1978 was followed by the entry of new airlines into the
market.31 The mid-1990s was marked by a “second wave” of new entrants
into the airline market.32 Between 1990 and 1995, as many as five new airlines entered the market each year.33 A “record” forty-two airlines submitted
applications for the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity in 1993,
which is a prerequisite for competing as a commercial airline carrier.34 Despite an auspicious start, the second half of the decade “was an era of
bankruptcies, liquidations and retrenchments for upstart airlines.”35 During
25

Id. at 327.
Id. at 327 n.53. Other slot allocation options under the FAA include a lottery system, an
auction, the “grandfathering of slots based on historical pattern,” and administrative
review. Id. The need for some regulatory authority to provide fair opportunity for market
entry for new airlines is evidenced by the airport’s difficulty to manage slot allocation. Id.
For instance, when the slot committee denied New York Air’s slot request at Washington
National Airport in the fall of 1980, the FAA intervened to approve the slot request. Id. In
this instance, the FAA served to remedy the pre-deregulation tendency of the CAB to
thwart most new entrants. See id. at 319.
27
Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 398.
28
Id. at 400. In the 1970s, advocates of deregulation “suggested that performance without
deregulatory intervention would approximate perfect competition.” Id. “Even when analysts
recognized that small numbers of competitors were characteristic of airline markets, a feature
which conventionally suggested imperfect competition, they tended to predict competitive
performance.” Id.
29
Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 403.
30
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 702. Though the notions of perfect competition and
perfect contestability are “both unattainable ideal states,” some economic theorists espouse
that perfect contestability serves as a more useful framework to guide analysis of the airline
industry. Elizabeth E. Bailey, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1
YALE J. ON REG. 111, 112 (1984) [hereinafter Bailey, Deregulation].
31
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 703. These new entrants to the airline market included
Midway Airlines, America West, and People Express. Id.
32
Id. at 704.
33
Id. at 688.
34
Id. at 705.
35
Id. at 688.
26
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the dry spell of 1995 to the first months of 1999, “not a single new airline
began service.”36
Empirical data suggest that deregulation minimally benefited enterprises
seeking to compete with incumbent airlines.37 Statistics regarding the profitability of the U.S. passenger airline market over the last several decades
are bleak.38 Domestic passenger airlines lost $59 billion between 1979 and
2009.39 Further, the airline industry operated at a profit during only eight of
the first thirty-one years following deregulation.40
Airline carriers have been spiraling downward in a trend of unprofitability
since deregulation.41 The 2000s have been described as “financially disastrous” for U.S. domestic airlines42 and analysts have noted the “volatility of
airline profits.”43 Data further suggest that airline carriers have been gaining momentum in their unprofitable plunge.44 For instance, of the roughly
$60 billion in losses incurred by the domestic airline carrier market over the
last thirty years, the majority occurred in the last decade.45 From 2008 to
2009, aggregate net losses for domestic passenger airlines were $14 billion
from a total revenue of $270 billion.46
Other forces apart from deregulation have contributed to the decreased
profitability of the domestic airline industry. Certain contributing variables
include “demand and cost shocks.”47 Cost factors contributing to decreased
profitability include high taxes and increased fuel costs.48 Tax and fuel are
considered exogenous factors, with fuel costs being “approximately the same
for all airlines.”49 Fuel price increases in 2008 undermined airline profitability
by necessitating a reduction in flight schedules.50 Additional costs include
36

Id.
Borenstein, supra note 3, at 2. Cf. Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at
397. (“Evidence of impediments to contestability in air transport markets does not affect
the policy conclusion that airline deregulation has been a very considerable improvement
over the previous regulated regime.”).
38
Borenstein, supra note 3, at 2.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 3.
41
Id. at 2.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 3.
44
Id. at 2.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 2.
47
Id. at 12.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 4, 10–11.
50
Id. at 6.
37
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airport-imposed passenger facility charges upon airlines which may consist
of up to $4.50 per passenger at commercial airports run by public agencies.51
Weak demand is one of the more decisive factors adversely affecting airline profitability.52 Decreased demand flows in part from heightened safety
concerns and increased inconvenience of travel resulting from the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.53 From 2000 to 2002, demand decreased at the
“unprecedented” rate of 20 percent.54 More expensive passenger fares may
have weakened demand for air travel as well. In the late 1990s, decreased
city-pair competition was accompanied by increased average airfare.55 Furthermore, intense competition from new entrant low-cost carriers played a
great role in undercutting demand for incumbent legacy carriers.56
B. Commercial Framework of the Airline Industry
An airport slot is the “right to operate a service at a particular time.”57 The
FAA originally distributed airport slots.58 The international standard for
“airport slot management” is set forth in the Worldwide Slot Guidelines of
the International Air Transport Association (IATA).59 Slot allocation permits
airlines to “acquire, retain and exchange” the slots needed to operate.60 The
IATA intends for the slot distribution process to facilitate the efficient use
of airport space for which there is high demand in order to maximize benefit to the greatest extent possible for passengers.61 The crucial need for
airport slots as a prerequisite to competitive viability for airline carriers is
evidenced by the use of airport slots as bartering chips. For instance, in
August 2010, Continental agreed to lease eighteen pairs of take-off and
51

Id. at 4. These fees are used “to fund FAA approved projects that enhance safety,
security, or capacity; reduce noise; or increase air carrier competition.” Passenger Facility
Charge (PFC) Program, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (last modified Feb. 11, 2015,
4:53 PM), http://www.faa.gov/airports/pfc/, archived at https://perma.cc/GNV2-VEF6
?type=source.
52
Borenstein, supra note 3, at 3.
53
Id. at 7.
54
Id.
55
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 688.
56
Borenstein, supra note 3. The threat posed to legacy carriers by low-cost carriers will be
discussed in greater detail later in this section.
57
Charlie Leocha, Who Owns Airport Slots? The American People or the Airlines?,
CONSUMER TRAVELER (Aug. 30, 2010), http://consumertraveler.com/today/who-owns-airport
slots-the-american-people-or-the-airlines/, archived at http://perma.cc/CLA8-37NF.
58
Id.
59
Worldwide Airport Slots, IATA, http://www.iata.org/policy/slots/Pages/slot-guide
lines.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3T88-FA2G.
60
Id.
61
Id.
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landing slots at Newark to Southwest Airlines in order to obtain approval
for a proposed merger.62
Airports are categorized according to the service they provide, such as
commercial, cargo, and general aviation airports.63 Commercial service airports provide service to a minimum of 2,500 passengers each year, with
primary airports each accommodating at least 10,000 passengers each year.64
Primary airports are further classified by hub type, which includes large,
medium, small, or non-hub and is determined by number of passengers per
year.65 Large hubs service at least 1 percent of annual passenger boardings.66
Medium and small hubs serve less than 1 percent of annual airline passengers, with non-hubs accommodating between 2,500 and 10,000 passenger
boardings per year.67
The ‘hub and spoke system’ has emerged as the “route structure of choice
for deregulated airlines.”68 The word ‘hub’ itself was “virtually absent from
pre-deregulation theoretical comment on the industry.”69 Following deregulation, most of the legacy airlines, except for Southwest Airlines, have
adopted the hub-and-spoke model.70 Hub dominance must be monitored with
care, due to its correlation with monopolization and “escalating fares” for
airline passengers.71
In the 1990s, a correlation was noted between increased hub concentration and a decline in competitive service.72 Department of Transportation
(DOT) research also confirmed that the most concentrated hubs produced
the highest air fares.73 After comparing prices at fifteen concentrated hub
airports and thirty-eight unconcentrated hub airports, the General Accounting
Office concluded that passenger fare is often as much as 27 percent greater at
concentrated hubs.74 Passengers departing from airport hubs may pay “50
percent more than they would had deregulation not occurred.”75 Furthermore,
62

Leocha, supra note 57.
Airport Categories, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (last modified Oct. 21, 2014, 4:36 PM),
http://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/passenger_allcargo_stats/categories/, archived
at http://perma.cc/9PLZ-6VVJ.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 411.
69
Id. at 413.
70
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692.
71
Id. at 695.
72
Id. at 688.
73
Id. at 696.
74
Id.
75
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 695.
63
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when one airline carrier controls more than half of the hub market, passengers often end up paying “significantly more than the industry norm.”76
Classic hubs are large airports that service major cities or highly populated areas.77 Such hubs typically cater to passengers on long distance flights
and utilize shorter “spoke” flights as needed to connect passengers to their
final destination.78 However, decreased efficiency due to waiting on connecting baggage and passengers is the cost of providing a greater variety of destination options by means of “spoke” flights.79
Hub dominance has stifled competition by permitting hub-dominant airlines to monopolize routes.80 Hub dominance “enables the dominant airline to
increase the number of city-pair monopolies radiating from the hub, allowing monopoly fares to be imposed on origin-and-destination passengers.”81
Airlines adamantly prefer this route structure, despite the heightened costs
of “hubbing,” which result from “lowering aircraft, gate, and labor utilization
and increasing fuel consumption.”82
Countervailing benefits of the hub-centric strategy include “scheduling
flexibility and insulation from new competition.”83 Once they have established a hub, airlines may then add on spokes to gain “incremental connecting
passengers,” thereby maximizing revenue potential.84 After establishing hubdominance, an airline may easily “increase the number of city-pair monopolies radiating from the hub,” and thereby maintain inflated passenger fare.85
The opportunity to lease gates plays a critical role in an airline’s ability to
generate profit.86 Greater control of a hub’s gates enables airlines to secure
“scheduling flexibility and insulation from new competition.”87 Restricting
access to gates therefore poses one of the most significant barriers to entry
for an airline competitor and implicates market contestability.88
76

Id.
Ryan Griffin, State Aid, the Growth of Low-Cost Carriers in the European Union, and
the Impact of the 2005 Guidelines on Financing of Airports and Start-Up Aid to Airlines Departing from Regional Airports, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 341, 345 (2006).
78
Id. at 344.
79
Id. at 346.
80
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 927 (6th Cir. 2005).
87
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692.
88
Spirit, 431 F.3d at 927. The notion of perfect market contestability will be discussed
later in this section.
77
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Although determination of route schedules and pricing has been almost
entirely unregulated since the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act,89 runway access remains largely regulated by local government.90 Airlines usually ensure
gate access through “long-term exclusive-use leases with the local airport
authority.”91 Further, there is no “formal market mechanism” in the distribution of gates by local airport commissions.92 The current regulatory scheme
does not preclude large airline carriers from forming “relationships with
airports that allow [them] to restrict the availability of gates, landing slots
and other resources to potential entrants.”93 As a result, access to gates by
new market entrants is “not determined by open competition.”94
Hub dominance through gate monopolization by large airline carriers has
raised concerns regarding alleged unlawful suppression of competition.95
In addition to airline competition, such practices also implicate consumer
welfare, as airline carriers holding a greater number of gate leases are able
to exact higher passenger fares.96 Other competitive practices by large airline
carriers trigger suspicion of unlawful competitive behavior.97 These practices include “frequent-flyer and corporate discount programs that exchange
discounts for customer loyalty.” 98 Further practices that enable legacy
carriers to derive benefit to the exclusion of low-cost carriers include “exclusive alliances with regional feeder carriers, their ability to bias the computer
reservations systems they own against competing interline connections, [and]
their ability to bribe travel agents with commission overrides to steer business their way.”99
In the airline industry, market concentration is analyzed based on overlapping city-pair routes.100 The Transportation Research Board of the National
89

Pub. L. No. 95–504, § 2493, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
Spirit, 431 F.3d at 928 (quoting Gautam Gowrisankaran, Competition and Regulation
in the Airline Industry, FED. RESERVE BD. OF S.F. ECON. LETTER, Number 2002-01, p. 1).
91
Spirit, 431 F.3d at 928. “In 1996, the GAO found that 76 of the 86 gates at the Detroit
airport were covered by long term leases until 2008 and Northwest had 64 of such
leases.” Id.
92
Id.
93
Borenstein, supra note 3, at 9; Borenstein, supra note 3, at 9–10.
94
Spirit, 431 F.3d at 927.
95
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 692.
96
Id.
97
Borenstein, supra note 3, 9–10.
98
Id. at 9.
99
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 702.
100
Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the
U.S. Airline Industry, 49 J.L. & ECON. 627, 631 (2006); see also Bailey, Deregulation,
supra note 30, at 113. The unattainable ideals of perfect competition and perfect contestability
are distinguishable. Id. However, both theoretical market states claim “totally unimpeded”
“entry into and exit from the industry” as a factor. Id. Perfectly competitive industries
90
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Research Council espouses that airline competition is properly analyzed in
terms of city pairs.101 Competition for airline passengers is thus framed in
consideration of “thousands of combinations of origin and destination (OD) points.”102
C. The Theory of Perfect Market Contestability
Under the contestability theory, “perfectly contestable” markets enable
new entrants to provide a competitive check on the pricing of incumbent businesses.103 While the degree to which a market is contestable hinges on many
variables, freedom of entry and exit for new market entrants is generally considered the single most influential factor.104 Contestability of markets hinges
on low barriers to entry, so that new entrants may offer competitive prices.105
Similarly, ease of exit serves the essential purpose of promoting investment
by preserving the ability to abandon an unprofitable investment.106
Proponents of the contestability theory within the context of the airline
industry maintain that low barriers to entry enable new market entrants to
become viable competitors, thereby restricting the ability of entrenched airlines to extract excessive profits.107 The view that competition provides a
natural check on unfair pricing relies on low barriers to entry, such that “if
fares rose, other airlines could easily enter the market.”108 Competitive pricing provided by new entrants would then provide consumers with lower-cost
options and force incumbents to lower fares in order to remain viable in
the market.109
It is useful to consider three features when calibrating the degree to which
a market approaches the ideal of perfect contestability.110 The first feature is
also must consist of “a large number of miniscule firms.” Id. at 118. This supports the argument for increased regulation in Part II, ensuring that at least some low-cost carrier new
entrants can remain viable promotes healthy competition by creating a market resembling
the theoretical model of perfect competition. See id. at 115. The ideal of perfect competition
has been criticized for “its lack of realism and its inflexibility.” Id.
101
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 933 (6th Cir. 2005).
102
Id.
103
Bailey, Deregulation, supra note 30, at 112.
104
Id. at 113.
105
Id. at 111.
106
Id. at 120.
107
Peter C. Carstensen, Evaluating “Deregulation of Commercial Air Travel: False
Dichotomization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 109, 115 (1989).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Bailey, Deregulation, supra note 30, at 120, 121. Because the notion of perfect
contestability, like perfect competition, “is highly improbable in reality,” analysts deem
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freedom of exit, which enables the new entrant to walk away from an unprofitable investment.111 Second, markets are considered contestable when
potential entrants can readily respond to opportunities to enter the market,
thereby serving as a “threat” to incumbent businesses and ensuring competitive pricing.112 The third factor indicating market contestability is the “sluggishness” in the competitive pricing responses of incumbent enterprises.113
Strict adherence to the idea of perfectly contestable markets suggests that
such markets do not require regulatory interference.114 Despite the accepted
notion that unrestricted entry and exit is crucial for promoting market contestability, public interest necessitates imposing regulatory restrictions in
certain circumstances.115 For instance, regulatory policies impeding exit have
been motivated by such concerns as maintaining access to service for remote
consumers and preserving jobs.116
During the deregulation of the airline industry, the Civil Aeronautics
Board propounded the contestability of aviation markets.117 Contestability
theory advocates have cited the successful unregulated airline markets in
California and Texas while contending that natural competition would produce lower fares and a more salubrious environment for new enterprises.118
Simple consideration of the mobility of aircraft seemed to support the notion
markets contestable even when “the requirements of contestability are fulfilled only
approximately.” Id. at 114. A second “formal definition” identifies contestable markets as
those in which there are no sunk costs, which are “outlay[s] that cannot be recouped
without substantial delay.” Id. at 113–14.
111
Id. at 120. “[F]reedom of exit is merely the obverse of freedom of entry.” Id. Following
an unsuccessful venture, a recent entrant may exit a perfectly contestable market without
sunk costs, thereby decreasing risk and encouraging competitive investment. Id. at 114.
112
Id. A “standby” new entrant’s ability to seize opportunities to offer competitively
priced, yet profitable, fares depends on the carrier’s ability to “choose the timing, place,
and manner of entry that best suits the circumstances.” Id. This Note contends that legacy
carrier’s monopolization of gate leases serves as a major impediment to contestability in light
of this second factor. Id. at 131.
113
Id. at 121. While the third factor is not “essential,” a lag period protects the new
entrant. Id. Though this may seem to inflate the price in the short term, helping new entrants
stay afloat ultimately aids competition by preventing market domination by incumbents.
Some even maintain “that regulation-induced lags in pricing may well be salutary.” Id.
114
Id. at 111.
115
Id. at 120. Such restrictions undermine contestability, because “[a]ny impediment
to exit by definition increases the riskiness, and hence the real cost, of opening for a business.”
116
Id. Countervailing public interest issues have arisen in both the railroad and airline
industries. Id. Such protectionist regulatory policy comes at the cost of inhibiting competition. Id. at 120. As opposed to the indirect, cross subsidy approach, critics have suggested
direct subsidization. Id.
117
Id. at 127–28.
118
Carstensen, supra note 107, at 115.
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of inherent competitive checks on passenger fare through entry of new competitors in a perfectly contestable market.119
This simplistic view of market entry fails to take into account that physically transferring investment capital is the final phase in the laborious process
of launching and establishing passenger service. More significant contestability considerations include the variety of obstacles that create high barriers
to entry in the airline industry.120 For instance, new market entrants—and
thus market contestability—are hampered by “network-reinforcing marketing
practices like price discrimination, customer loyalty programs, travel agency
incentive programs, and computer reservations system (CRS) search bias, as
well as the use of historic airport facilities commitments.”121
The variety of obstacles contributing to high barriers to entry in the airline
industry indicate that the airline industry is far from achieving perfect contestability and that complete deregulation does not produce optimal competition.122 In light of these entry obstacles for new airlines, proponents of
perfect contestability must temper the notion that completely deregulated
markets are “the best of all possible worlds” against the reality that some market intervention may be necessary to protect both airline competitors as well
as air passengers.123
D. The Low-Cost Carrier Business Model
Consistent with their name, low-cost air carriers utilize operational strategies that minimize cost and promote efficiency, thereby enabling them to
provide lower passenger fares.124 Herb Kelleher established the prototype for
the low-cost carrier model when he started Southwest Airlines in 1971.125
Other established low-cost carriers include Frontier, Vanguard, Reno, Kiwi,
and Spirit.126 Following the deregulation of the United States airline industry,
low-cost carriers have served to promote efficiency, increase destination options, and decrease passenger fare.127
119
Elizabeth E. Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy,
71 AM. ECON. ASS’N. 178, 179–80 (1981) [hereinafter Bailey, Contestability]. Cf. Bailey,
Deregulation, supra note 30, at 128 (“[T]he majority of U.S. city-pair markets are natural
monopolies (and so are likely to be served by only one carrier even under free entry) and
all markets are likely to show high concentration.”).
120
Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 335.
121
Michael E. Levine, Airline Alliances and Systems Competition: Antitrust Policy
Toward Airlines and the Department of Justice Guidelines, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 335
(2008) [hereinafter Levine, Airline Alliances].
122
Levine, Airline Competition, supra note 1, at 397.
123
Bailey, Deregulation, supra note 30, at 112.
124
Griffin, supra note 77, at 345.
125
Id. at 343.
126
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 698.
127
Griffin, supra note 77, at 343–44.
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The Department of Transportation concurs that low-cost carriers produce
consumer savings while increasing route density.128 Further benefit includes
the effect of low-cost carriers in providing a competitive check on passenger
fare prices offered by incumbent legacy carriers.129 In dominated hub markets, low-cost carrier service may provide consumers with savings of up to
seventy dollars per passenger, or 40 percent, for one-way fares.130
Low-cost carriers in the United States have been noted as “the world’s
most mature.”131 In addition to challenging the traditional business model
of incumbent airlines, domestic low-cost carriers provide steep competition
for one another as route density increases.132 For example, whereas low-cost
carriers only overlapped on twenty-three routes in 2005, they competed for
market share on 139 routes by the end of 2009.133
The efficiency of the low-cost carrier business model has enabled new
entrant airlines to provide lower passenger fares while maintaining competitive pressure on entrenched legacy airlines.134 For instance, American Airlines, one of the largest domestic carriers, incurs costs on domestic flights that
are 26.9 percent greater than Southwest and exceed JetBlue’s costs by 62.5
percent.135 The two mainstays of the low-cost carrier strategy are “simple
products and low operating costs.”136 Other crucial low-cost carrier tactics
include “a single passenger class, a single type of airplane, a simple fare
scheme, unreserved seating, flights to secondary airports, point-to-point rather
than hub and spoke networks, emphasis on direct ticket sales, and elimination
of in-flight meals and other in-flight services.”137
Elimination of costs by low-cost carriers depends on uniformity and simplicity of service.138 Low-cost carriers maximize efficiency by eliminating
first- and business-class tickets as well as reserved seating.139 Offering only
one class of ticket further serves to maximize the number of passengers per
flight and to reduce turnaround time by enabling passengers to board the
128

Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 926 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing
U.S. Department of Transportation, The Low Cost Airline Service Revolution, Apr. 1996
at 9).
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Andrew Compart, Low-Cost Clash, 172 AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. 22 (June 8,
2010).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Griffin, supra note 77, at 344.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 345.
139
Id.
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aircraft more quickly.140 Low-cost carriers also streamline cost through the
elimination of complimentary services and features, such as airplane window
blinds, reclining seats, seat pockets, and headrest covers.141
The low-cost carrier strategy also incorporates use of secondary airports.142 Flying into secondary airports minimizes an air carrier’s operating
costs, because secondary airports often charge less stringent landing and
service fees.143 Taking advantage of these lower fees is critical for streamlining operational expenses, because such airport fees are one of airlines’
major costs.144 Airlines obtain further benefit through use of secondary airports by means of increased efficiency.145 The decreased congestion of secondary airports enables low-cost carriers to achieve faster turnaround times,
thereby maximizing the daily number of flights provided by each airplane.146
Low-cost carriers further minimize costs by utilizing only one model
of aircraft and engine.147 A “uniform fleet” provides for decreased cost of
training for pilots, flight attendants, and maintenance crews.148 Maintaining one type of plane is less expensive, because airlines can stock up on spare
parts without worrying that they will become useless.149 Further, operating
with one style of aircraft contributes to operating efficiency, because switching between aircraft models would require training for pilots, mechanics,
and crew.150
Even though the survival of low-cost carriers precariously hinges upon
the single variable of competitive pricing, whereas legacy carriers extract
benefit through a variety of aggressive tactics, low-cost carriers have nevertheless threateningly encroached upon market share.151 The success of lowcost carriers has placed “enormous pressure on the established carriers.”152
Legacy carriers, whose business model relies on brand-name recognition,
have realized that consumers are motivated more by lower prices than by
loyalty to a particular brand.153
140

Id.
Id.
142
Id. at 344.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 345.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
See id. at 345; see also Dempsey, supra note 1, at 702.
152
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 703.
153
Id. at 702–03.
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The success of the low-cost carrier business model comes from the
ability to fuel demand by means of “lower but still profit-producing fares.”154
Soon after entering the market in 1971, low-cost carriers established themselves as viable competitors and have been recognized as “the driving force
in the industry” since the mid-1990s. 155 By 2006, low-cost carriers had
obtained roughly 35 percent of the United States domestic airline market.156
By this time, Southwest Airlines had become the fourth-largest domestic airline, as based upon volume of passengers.157 Low-cost carriers have maintained a trend of prosperity since the 1990s.158 As a result, low-cost carriers
were competing with legacy carriers on more than 60 percent of city-pairs
by 2011.159 In addition, the relative success of legacy carriers as compared to
low-cost carriers is compromised by the fact that legacy carrier operating
costs have exceeded those of their low-cost counterparts by at least 40 percent
since the early 2000s. 160 Data indicates that low-cost carriers consistently
incurred fewer losses than legacy carriers in the last decade.161 This disparity in efficiency and success is exacerbated by the particular demands of the
aviation industry, in which a successful airline must “earn[] consistent profits
through the typical cycles in the airline business environment.”162
In addition to forcing legacy carriers to share the market, the prevalence
of low-cost options has caused anxiety among traditionally dominant carriers by reducing their ability to sell more expensive fares.163 With the entry
of each new low-cost carrier, the proportion of low to high cost passenger
fares increases accordingly. 164 In some instances, the average fare has
dropped from $173 to approximately $115.165 The prevalence of low-cost options has “dramatically” reduced demand for more costly passenger fares.166
Low-cost carriers’ threatening encroachment upon the market share
and profits of established airlines has incited various retaliatory responses
among legacy carriers.167 Major air carriers have exercised defensive tactics “when a small affordable air carrier enters the market they dominate.”168
154

Compart, supra note 131.
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 704.
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Griffin, supra note 77, at 346.
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Borenstein, supra note 3, at 11.
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Id. at 13.
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Id.
163
See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 927 (6th Cir. 2005).
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Dempsey, supra note 1, at 688–99.
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Id. at 689.
155

728

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:711

This has been identified by some as a “campaign to eradicate competition”
out of fear that these new low-cost entrants would force legacy carriers to
lower passenger fares.169
The panicked response of legacy carriers has been described by aviation law scholar Paul Stephen Dempsey as a “homicidal mission to destroy
the low-fare airlines.”170 The Justice Department reported as early as 1993
that legacy carrier American Airlines estimated the invasion of low passenger
fares threatened $3.6 billion in annual revenue.171 By the late 1990s, various legacy carriers had established adversarial stances against particular lowfare competitors, including United against Frontier and Western Pacific,
American against Vanguard and Western Pacific, Delta against ValuJet, and
Northwest against Spirit Airlines.172
Defensive measures adopted by legacy carriers in order to maintain their
stranglehold on the market include the expansion of legacy carrier networks
by means of mergers and megacarrier alliances.173 Legacy carriers also provide nonstop fares corresponding to low-cost carrier connecting fares in an
attempt to maintain their market share.174 A further strategy of “saturat[ing]
the route” with low fares in order to undermine low-cost carrier ticket sales
has spurred claims of price predation.175 These allegedly predatory tactics
practiced by large incumbent airlines include adding both flights and seats to
routes threatened by low-cost carriers in order to force them from the market, reducing prices to “below-cost levels,” and tampering with computer
reservations to ensure that competitor’s connections are less convenient.176
Legacy airlines have even been accused of bribing travel agents with commissions in order to secure reservations.177
Although the DOT was initially able to thwart price predation through
“moral persuasion,” the DOT recognized the futility of this approach and
set forth an official policy statement regarding anti-competitive and exclusionary practices by 1998.178 The DOT established guidelines geared towards preventing the practice of hub-dominant carriers of adding flights
and seats while lowering passenger fares.179 According to the DOT, predation
169

Id.
Id. at 688.
171
Id. at 699.
172
Id. at 689. Northwest’s alleged attempt to force Spirit Airlines out of the market
through price predation will provide the basis for discussion in Part II of this Note.
173
Borenstein, supra note 3, at 13; see also Dempsey, supra note 1, at 701.
174
Dempsey, supra note 1, at 689.
175
Id. at 689.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 690.
178
Id. at 689–90.
179
See Charles E. Koob, Whither Predatory Pricing? The Divergence Between Judicial
Decisions and Economic Theory: The American Airlines and Virgin Atlantic Airways Cases,
170
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includes “any response to new entry by a hub-dominant airline that makes
economic sense only because the hub carrier can exclude the new entrant
from the market and thereafter return to its pre-entry fares.”180
Following thirty-two claims of alleged price predation against legacy
carriers, the DOT issued a statement on Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in
1998, and a corresponding policy in 2001.181 Seventeen of these claims were
made by new entrants to the airline market, supporting the widely adopted
conclusion that incumbent airlines were targeting their younger low-cost
competitors.182 The Department of Justice (DOJ) first alleged antitrust violations based on price predation against one of the major legacy carriers,
American Airlines, in May of 1990.183 Action by the DOJ was triggered by
the acute suppression of competition as a result of the conduct of legacy carriers, such as American Airlines.184
According to the Supreme Court, price predation occurs when a competitor sets prices “below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose
of eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the
long run.”185 Varying theories exist concerning cost measurement for the
purposes of identifying predatory pricing.186 While analysts have not settled upon a “perfect touchstone,” courts generally look to “the relation of the
suspect price to the firm’s costs.”187 Because courts are wary of inhibiting
healthy, consumer-beneficial competition, courts tend to strictly construe
predatory pricing standards.188 Generally, pricing is predatory when it is less
3 SEDONA CONF. J. 9, 12 (2002); see also DOT Proposal, Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in
Air Transportation Industry, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50, 163, 49, 227 (1998).
180
Koob, supra note 179, at 11–12.
181
See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 690; see also DOT Proposal, supra note 179; DOT,
Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation
Industry, Docket OST-98-3713 (Jan. 17, 2001).
182
See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 690.
183
Id. at 690–91; see also Koob, supra note 179, at 11.
184
See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 691. In 1999 alone, the discontent of consumers was
evidenced as complaints increased by 115 percent. Id. The purpose of antitrust law is to
secure “the protection of competition, not competitors.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 320 (1962). The ultimate goal of the protection of fair and open competition is to
benefit the consumer, who is “the presumptively ‘proper’ plaintiff.” SAS of Puerto Rico,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 48 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1995).
185
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986).
186
See Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1695, 1753 (Nov. 2013).
187
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F. 2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983).
Determining price predation upon “intent to harm” is not a widely adopted court standard,
and has been criticized for ambiguity as well as the ready means by which firms may
simply avoid displaying any signs of intent. Id.
188
Id. at 232. Pricing that appears too low to cover an appropriate measure of costs may
result from a variety of non-predatory purposes and variables, such as promotional or free
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than the figure produced by dividing the airline’s average variable costs189
for a flight by the number of seats for that flight.190
Due to the dangerous overlap between predatory behavior and aggressively competitive pricing, the Supreme Court established a high threshold
for antitrust injury based upon predatory pricing through the Brooke Group
test.191 Under the first prong of the test, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant unprofitably set prices below an appropriate measure of cost.192
The second prong stipulates that the defendant must have had a “reasonable
prospect of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”193 This period
of recoupment enables the business to recover for losses sustained during the
seemingly irrational period of unprofitable predatory pricing.194
In order to determine the ability of a business to successfully recoup
losses incurred through a sub-competitive predatory pricing period, the Supreme Court looks to the nature of the market.195 The possibility of recoupment depends primarily upon market concentration, the feasibility for the
defendant to acquire the plaintiff’s share of the market, and high barriers
to entry.196 While the Court is reticent to find for plaintiffs in price predation cases, it has at least acknowledged that the nature of the airline industry
“can at a minimum allow unfair exclusionary practices to succeed.”197
samples as well as anticipated decrease in incremental or variable costs. Id. Courts attempt to
filter predatory pricing claims in order to protect legitimate competition. Id.
189
This is often used by courts as an “appropriate measure of cost.” Spirit Airlines,
Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 917 (6th Cir. 2005); see also James L. Robenalt,
Predatory Pricing in the Low-Fare Airline Market: Targeted, Discriminatory, and Achieved
with Impunity, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 641, 650 (2007).
190
See, e.g., Robenalt, supra note 189, at 659.
191
See Koob, supra note 179, at 10; see also DOT Proposal, Unfair Exclusionary Conduct
in Air Transportation Industry, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50, 163, 49, 227 (1998); Brooke
Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 210 (1993).
192
Brooke, 509 U.S. at 510.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 210.
195
See Koob, supra note 179, at 10; see also Brooke, 509 U.S. at 226.
196
Id.
197
Koob, supra note 179, at 12; Dempsey, supra note 1, at 805 (citing DOT, Request for
Comments in Docket OST-98-3717 (Apr. 6, 1998)). The Supreme Court “has said that predation rarely occurs and is even more rarely successful.” Id. Despite the Court’s conclusion,
analysts contend that the airline industry by its structure and inherent characteristics tends
to “allow unfair exclusionary practices to succeed.” Id. This characteristic is strikingly
evident when the air carriers are compared to enterprises in different industries, because a
major air carrier can price-discriminate to a much greater extent, adjust prices much
faster, and shift resources between markets much more readily. Through booking and other
data generated by computer reservations systems and other sources, air carriers have access to
comprehensive, ‘real time’ information on their competitors’ activities and can thus respond
to competitive initiatives more precisely and swiftly than firms in other industries. Id.

2015] INCREASED REGULATION OF AIRLINE INDUSTRY

731

Plaintiffs may pursue predatory pricing claims under section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.198 Plaintiffs must establish (1) that defendant secured
monopoly power in the relevant market; and that (2) this power was used for
anti-competitive or exclusionary purposes, as opposed to “growth or development resulting from a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.” 199 Due to the difficulty in distinguishing between legitimate
competition and predatory behavior, courts typically “resolve antitrust claims
on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the ‘particular facts disclosed by the
record.’”200 Such modes of antitrust enforcement are intended not to protect
businesses from unfair competition, but to “protect the public from the failure
of the market.”201
II. ASSESSING AND MINIMIZING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREDATORY
PRICING IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
A. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.: The Spirit Court’s
Analysis Is Flawed
Plaintiff Spirit Airlines, Inc. (“Spirit”), sued defendant Northwest Airlines, Inc. (“Northwest”), under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2.202 Spirit alleged that Northwest intended to monopolize the “leisure passenger airline market[]” through the predatory pricing of passenger
fares.203 Spirit specifically alleged that Northwest had the predatory purpose
of ousting Spirit from the Detroit-Boston and Detroit-Philadelphia routes.204
The District Court granted Northwest’s motion for summary judgment,
accepting its argument that price-cost comparison should consider all
passengers along the disputed routes and not just the low-fare ‘leisure’
bracket.205 A price-cost comparison taking into account other routes in addition to Northwest’s ‘leisure’ portion does not support predatory pricing,
Ultimately, this ability to achieve entrenchment enables legacy carriers to drive new entrants
from their hub fortresses. Id.
198
See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009).
199
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 932 (6th Cir. 2005). (quoting
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595–96 (1985)).
200
Id. at 931–32 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 482-83 (1992) (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107, 68 S. Ct. 941, 92
L.Ed. 1236 (1948)). In Spirit, the most pertinent “particular facts” deal with the unique nature
of the airline industry, particularly in regards to fare structure and pricing. Id. at 931.
201
Spectrum Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
202
Spirit, 431 F.3d at 921. Spirit levied claims of monopolization and attempted
monopolization against Northwest under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id.
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because revenues for those routes would not be “irrationally” lower than corresponding costs, thus making the routes unprofitable.206
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that
Northwest’s route monopolization created opportunity for recoupment,
thereby preserving Spirit’s price predation claim. 207 Further, the circuit
court concluded “that a reasonable trier of fact could find that a separate
and distinct low-fare or leisure-passenger market existed.” 208 However,
although the Spirit court supported the Ninth Circuit’s partial adoption of
the Areeda/Turner test, it did not set forth its own version of average variable cost.209
At the time of the suit, Spirit was a low-fare carrier operating out of
Detroit.210 Spirit’s argument hinged on its depiction of a relevant market
consisting of “low fare or leisure passengers.”211 By contrast, Northwest’s
broader definition of the market encompassed both low and high fare segments of the market by incorporating “all passengers on these routes.”212
As of 1995, Northwest achieved status as the fourth-largest domestic airline.213 Northwest had a virtual monopoly over sixty-four of the eighty-six
airport gates at the Detroit Metro airport and received business from 78 percent of passengers flying through the airport.214 Utilizing the traditional huband-spoke model, Northwest developed airport clubs, frequent flyer benefits,
advanced seat selection, first class seating, and on-board meals in order to
maximize revenue and to “try to sell every seat at its highest possible
206

Id. at 957.
Id. at 921. Spirit supported its recoupment argument with evidence, including
“Northwest’s own marketing data, the testimony of its marketing officials, the findings of
government regulators and Spirit’s experts.” Id. The District Court held that a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that Northwest practiced predatory pricing, because at the time in
question, “the market in the two relevant geographic routes was highly concentrated,
Northwest possessed overwhelming market share, and the barriers to entry were high.” Id.
208
Id. The court’s isolation of a low-fare leisure bracket of the market preserved Spirit’s
price predation claim, because comparing Northwest’s costs against a smaller pool of
revenue from the leisure bracket supports the possibility that Northwest intentionally
sustained a period of unprofitability, thereby satisfying prong one of the Brooke Group
test. Id. Prong two addresses the possibility of recoupment. Brooke, 509 U.S. at 224.
209
See Spirit, 431 F.3d at 938.
210
Id. at 922.
211
Id. at 921. This portrayal of the market for the purposes of price-cost comparison
was essential to Spirit’s ability to prove price predation. Evaluating Northwest’s costs
solely against the low-fare segment makes it more likely that an expert would conclude
that Northwest’s costs exceeded revenue for that route, and thus that Spirit intentionally
engaged in the predatory behavior of engaging in an unprofitable venture in order to secure
long term gain.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 923.
214
Id.
207
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fare.”215 Whereas Northwest secured consumer loyalty through name-brand
appeal and a business model that relied upon “bells and whistles,” Spirit’s
profitability depended solely upon the appeal of its competitively priced
passenger fares.216
At the time of suit, Northwest controlled 72 percent of the DetroitPhiladelphia route and 89 percent of the Detroit-Boston route.217 Northwest sought to preserve its virtual monopoly of these routes by thwarting
Spirit’s attempt to expand ticket counter and gate services at the Detroit
Metropolitan Airport.218 Northwest entrenched itself by means of leases
and secondary rights from other airlines.219 According to its own analysts,
Northwest predicted that low-cost carriers would decrease its revenue by
approximately $250–375 million per year.220 Northwest identified Spirit as
such a low-fare carrier in one of its studies.221
B. The Precarious Standard of Predatory Intent
The Spirit court held that a jury may decide that “price-sensitive leisure
passengers” constitute the relevant market segment for the purposes of the
price-cost comparison, thereby preserving the possibility that Northwest
illegally engaged in price predation.222 Further, the Spirit court incorrectly
evaluated Northwest’s alleged predatory pricing on the basis of predatory
intent, despite concluding that Northwest’s prices exceeded average variable
costs on both routes.223 The court maintained that Spirit could nevertheless
prevail under the test of “what a rational firm would have expected its prices
to accomplish.”224 The danger of the subjective intent-based standard is that it
215

Id.; see also Bailey, Deregulation, supra note 30, at 115. Northwest’s inefficient
business model, which incurs unnecessary expense in order to secure consumer loyalty,
would not be sustainable amidst pressure from low-cost carriers in a perfectly contestable
market, or perhaps even a closer approximation to perfect contestability. Id. at 118. Northwest’s profitability despite attempted entry by low-cost carriers, such as Spirit, therefore
indicates an unhealthy and anti-competitive market in which enterprises may seize opportunities to exercise predatory tactics. Id.
216
See Spirit, 431 F.3d at 922.
217
Id. at 923.
218
Id. at 922.
219
Id. Such strategy constitutes unfair exclusionary practice. This Note contends that
the ability for airlines to lawfully monopolize routes under the current regulatory regime
is symptomatic of an ailing system and evidences the need for reforms that limit unfair
barriers to entry. See infra Part II.C.
220
Spirit, 431 F.3d at 929.
221
Id.
222
Id. at 958.
223
Id. at 938.
224
Id. The Spirit court’s utilization of an intent based standard is in line with the Ninth
Circuit’s standard, which likewise bases predation upon intent, even when prices exceed
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provides no reliable means for distinguishing between illegal predatory
behavior and legitimate competitive tactics.225
Due to high barriers of entry to the airline industry, courts could interpret
long-term gate leases as evidence of legacy carriers’ unlawful intent to secure
the probability of a recoupment period following predatory pricing. 226
However, this subjective standard fails to consider a variety of objective variables that influence both the short-term strategy and long-term business
models of hub-dominant airline carriers.227 For instance, regardless of high
barriers to entry, air carriers may provide seemingly unprofitable fares due to
anticipated decline in costs or the success of consumer loyalty programs.
C. The Way Forward: A Case for Increased Regulation of the Airline Industry
The current legal framework fails to protect competitors—and therefore consumers—from predatory pricing. However, the hesitancy of courts
to condemn major carriers for the “discriminatory sharp-shooting” of new
entrants may not stem from any shortcoming of the current legal standard.228
Courts are likely justified in their deference to competition and weariness
of condemning lawful, albeit aggressive tactics.
This Note supports the seemingly ‘defendant friendly’ stance of the District Court in Spirit that the price-cost comparison test for price predation
should derive the appropriate measure of cost from all passengers along the
disputed routes.229 Considering only the limited leisure fair route for the purposes of price comparison as part of the Brooke Group test improperly simplifies the fluid and multifaceted relationship between passenger fare and
strategies for deriving revenue.230 Even uniform adoption of the District
Court’s assessment of the relevant market for purposes of the price-cost comparison test would fail to sufficiently police price predation. Due to the risk of
injustice and harm to competitors that may result from the court’s inability to
properly distinguish aggressive yet legitimate competitive behavior from
predatory tactics, this Note suggests that the solution lies not in a retroactive
average variable cost. See William Inglis v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1034
(9th Cir. 1981) (contending that the intent based test arguably favors plaintiffs). Cf. Morgan v.
Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1359 (8th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that the intent based standard improperly rests upon statements and behaviors influenced by the “heat of competition” in
fact “provide[s] no help in deciding whether a defendant has crossed the elusive line separating aggressive competition from unfair competition”).
225
See Robenalt, supra note 189, at 668.
226
Id. at 649.
227
Id. at 668.
228
See Dempsey, supra note 1, at 736.
229
See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d at 917, 921 (6th Cir. 2005).
230
Id. at 957.
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judicial test, but rather in prophylactic measures through regulatory policy.
One clear route to such a remedy would be to modify FAA regulations so
that opportunities for price predation are thwarted from the onset. In particular, such regulations should focus on decreasing barriers to entry by ensuring
fair access to routes and to gate and terminal leases.
The Spirit court’s reliance on predatory intent and the price-cost comparison test is potentially harmful in its ineffectiveness to identify predatory
pricing.231 Further, even if such case-by-case analysis properly sorted out
predatory enterprises, any sanctions against defendants would still fail to
remedy the fact that the new entrant ousted from the market permanently lost
that particular opportunity to secure a share of the market.232 It is understandable that the Spirit court did not highlight market contestability in its
discussion of Northwest’s alleged price predation. However, though admittedly an “unattainable ideal state[],” the theoretical notion of perfect
market contestability nevertheless provides a helpful framework in price
predation cases.233
Enacting regulations that lower barriers to entry is a clear place to start
in order to prevent predatory behavior. Experts acknowledge that “access to
gates is critical” to the viability of new entrants.234 Particularly in regards to
the airline industry, entry is not simply determined by developing the best
business model, because denying entrants access to gates creates insurmountable barriers to entry.235 Providing new entrants with the reasonable
expectation of securing gate leases would lower barriers to entry and maintain a competitive check on passenger fares offered by dominant airlines.
Facilitating market entry would deter carriers from engaging in price predation by obviating the possibility of satisfying the second prong of the
Brooke Group test.236
The seemingly irrational practice of sub-competitive pricing is only pursued when the possibility of recoupment exists.237 However, without the
market dominance secured by high barriers to entry, passengers would not
231
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pay for higher fares during the legacy carrier’s recoupment period due to the
prevalence of more competitive options provided by low-cost carriers.238
Therefore, prosecuting price predation should not hinge upon penalizing the
alleged predator after the fact, but should instead rely upon preventative
measures. Such strategy would further the intent of antitrust law by promoting healthy competition.
Relying upon the judicial system in order to deter price predation fails to
stave off predatory behavior or to remedy high barriers to market entry. Even
if courts were able to enact a test that properly identified price predation,
successful plaintiffs would still remain in an unprofitable position.239 Even if
such plaintiffs were afforded entry into the market, they would still have
permanently lost the opportunity for profit that depended on the prior convergence of favorable factors. Guaranteeing market entry following a suit would
be an insufficient remedy, because the new entrant would likely not become
profitable following the delay. Therefore, acknowledging the insufficiency
of retroactive action, the solution lies in anticipating and regulating circumstances that create high barriers to market entry.
The harm of gate monopolies and the likely effectiveness of prophylactic
measures240 is clear from the facts in Spirit.241 Due to Northwest’s control
of the Detroit gates, Spirit eventually spent more than $100,000 to obtain
gate access and was forced to pay a 25 percent higher landing fee than legacy
carriers, such as Northwest, which had secured long term leases with the
Detroit Airport.242
The ability of entrenched incumbents to establish high barriers to market
entry unequivocally highlights the need to regulate opportunities for market
entrants. While guaranteeing equal access to all competitors would unnecessarily strain already space-constrained airports and likely diminish the
quality of passenger service, at least some reasonable opportunity to enter the
market must be available to new enterprises. Once a new airline manages
to secure access to a portion of the market, assuming the absence of other
exclusionary forces, consumer choice should reward the most efficient and
238
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appealing business model. Most critically, ensuring that incumbent airlines
share the market with low-cost carriers would provide an essential competitive check on passenger fares. Absent the presence of competition, ticket
prices for any route would soar.
Increased regulation as opposed to reliance upon judicial enforcement
against predatory pricing is further supported by the inability of the pricecost comparison test to definitively identify price predation. One problem
is that the current standard for determining whether a defendant airline engaged in price predation is high, reflecting reticence to sanction airlines for
what may be legal competition.243 Departure from judicial tests in favor of
preventative measures is also necessitated by the ambiguities upon which
the judicial test is premised. One such unsettled component is a competitor’s
ability to recoup. Courts look to the existence of high barriers to entry in
order to determine whether the defendant airline could engage in a recoupment period.244 A court is willing to find that defendant engaged in price
predation when barriers to entry are “sufficiently high so that the predator
can rely on a stable period of monopoly returns.”245 However, while high
barriers to entry accurately indicate the possibility of successful recoupment, they are not dispositive of a defendant’s predatory intent or actual
predatory behavior.246
The price structure and tactics of hub-dominant legacy carriers further
expose the imprecision of the current judicial test. Legacy carriers have a
“multi-layered fare structure” that is in itself not predatory, but may be manipulated for a predatory purpose.247 Incumbent airlines combine both low
and high fares within a single flight, such that costs cannot be separated
according to seat and compared with revenue for the purpose of the pricecost comparison on a flight-by-flight basis.248 This makes it difficult to assess
whether passengers on a particular route are paying fares that are above or
below average variable cost. Further, it is difficult to determine whether a defendant intentionally sustained a period of unprofitability for those routes.249
Discontent with the current standard arises from the inability of the judicial test to “draw an adequate distinction between predation and vigorous
243
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competition.”250 Due to this difficulty in separating low-fare from high-fare
passenger routes, the Spirit court’s decision to isolate the low-fare leisure
bracket therefore sets precedent that risks penalizing lawful competitors.251
CONCLUSION
The structure of the airline industry heightens antitrust concerns among
its competitors. Incumbent legacy airlines have been able to use their clout
to erect high barriers of entry for new entrant low-cost carriers. Further, the
retaliatory response of legacy carriers to lower prices has been devastating
for low-cost carriers, whose business model relies entirely upon attracting
passengers with lower fare options. Such aggressive competitive maneuvering among legacy carriers has led to allegations of price predation.
This Note contends that courts are justifiably hesitant to find that a defendant airline engaged in price predation under section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. Many aspects of the judicial test, particularly average variable
cost, price-cost comparison, and identifying the relevant market provide imprecise means of calculation for considering whether a defendant actually
engaged in predatory pricing. Of great concern is the emphasis placed upon
high barriers to entry in evaluating a defendant’s intent. While such barriers
indicate the possibility that a defendant engaged in price predation, they do
not contribute to the price-cost analysis or in any way confirm a defendant’s
predatory purpose.
Even though high barriers to market entry do not provide evidence of a
defendant airline’s predatory intent, they nevertheless present an undue
obstacle to competition. Instead of inhibiting competition by penalizing defendants, prophylactic measures should be taken to obviate any possibility
of price predation by eliminating such barriers in the first place. Regulating
market entry so that legacy carriers do not monopolize airport slots and gates
would benefit consumers by ensuring that competitively priced airlines prevent legacy carriers from charging exorbitant passenger fares.
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